Do you think Accidents have their own ‘to be’? Justify your answer.

In the philosophical discourse, the question of whether accidents have their own 'to be' involves a nuanced exploration of the metaphysical nature of accidents and their existence. To address this question, it's essential to distinguish between substance and accident, drawing from classical metaphysical frameworks.

1. Substance and Accident:

   • Classical metaphysics, particularly influenced by thinkers like Aristotle, distinguishes between substances and accidents. Substances are considered primary entities with independent existence, while accidents are secondary qualities or properties that depend on substances for their existence.

2. Dependence of Accidents:

   • Accidents, by their nature, are dependent on substances. They are qualities or characteristics that inhere in a substance but do not exist independently. For example, the color of an apple, its weight, or its temperature are accidents that rely on the apple as a substance.

3. Non-Independent 'To Be' of Accidents:

   • Accidents do not have an independent 'to be' in the same way substances do. Their existence is intimately tied to the substances in which they exist. The 'to be' of accidents is derived from the 'to be' of the substances to which they belong.

4. Aristotelian View:

   • In Aristotle's metaphysics, substances are the primary reality, and accidents are considered as modifications or determinations of substances. The 'to be' of an accident is thus contingent upon the 'to be' of the substance in which it inheres.

5. Existential Dependency:

   • Accidents lack existential independence. Their existence is contingent upon the existence of the substances they modify. The 'to be' of accidents is derived from the 'to be' of the underlying substances, and they do not have a self-sufficient existence.

6. Ontological Status:

   • While substances are often attributed with a more robust ontological status, accidents are regarded as derivative and secondary. Their 'to be' is intertwined with the existence of substances, and they lack the self-subsistence associated with independent entities.

In conclusion, the 'to be' of accidents is intricately linked to the 'to be' of the substances in which they exist. Accidents, as secondary qualities, do not possess an independent 'to be' but derive their existence from the substances they modify. This perspective aligns with classical metaphysical views that distinguish between primary substances and secondary accidents, highlighting the interdependence of their existence.