Write a short note on distinguish between the Nyāya and Buddhist conceptions of ‘inference’.

The Nyāya and Buddhist philosophical traditions both offer unique perspectives on the concept of inference (anumāna), yet they differ in their fundamental conceptions and methodologies.

Nyāya Conception of Inference:
In the Nyāya tradition, inference is considered as one of the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) alongside perception (pratyakṣa), testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), and presumption (arthāpatti). Inference is characterized by a structured process involving five components: the subject (sādhya), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana). Nyāya philosophers emphasize the importance of a valid reason (hetu) that is invariably connected with the subject (sādhya) and is universally present in the example (udāharaṇa) and subject.

Buddhist Conception of Inference:
In contrast, Buddhist epistemology, particularly within the Pramāṇavāda tradition, offers a distinct perspective on inference. While Buddhist thinkers acknowledge the role of inference in acquiring knowledge, they emphasize the importance of direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the primary means of knowledge. Inference is often viewed as a secondary means, subordinate to perception and testimony. Buddhist philosophers propose various forms of inference, such as inference based on dependence (parārthānumāna) and inference based on reciprocal dependence (anyonyānumāna), to explain certain aspects of reality.

Despite these differences, both Nyāya and Buddhist conceptions of inference share the common goal of acquiring valid knowledge. While Nyāya emphasizes the structured process of inference with specific criteria for validity, Buddhist epistemology integrates inference within a broader framework of perception and emphasizes its role as a supportive means of knowledge acquisition. These distinct conceptions contribute to the richness and diversity of Indian philosophical thought.