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The "is-ought gap," also known as Hume's Guillotine, refers to the philosophical observation made by the Scottish philosopher David Hume regarding the distinction between descriptive statements about how the world is (the "is" statements) and prescriptive statements about how the world ought to be (the "ought" statements).
Hume famously argued that it is logically fallacious to derive normative or ethical conclusions solely from descriptive premises. In other words, he posited that statements about what is the case in the world (descriptive statements) cannot logically entail statements about what ought to be the case (prescriptive statements).
For example, consider the following statements:
Hume's point is that the fact that people tend to act in their self-interest (the descriptive statement) does not logically necessitate the conclusion that they should always act in the best interests of others (the prescriptive statement). The gap between what is and what ought to be cannot be bridged through logical inference alone.
This observation has profound implications for ethical reasoning and moral philosophy. It suggests that ethical principles and values cannot be derived solely from empirical observations about the world. Instead, ethical judgments involve normative commitments and value judgments that go beyond mere descriptions of empirical facts.
While the is-ought gap poses a challenge for ethical theories seeking to ground morality in naturalistic or empirical foundations, it also underscores the complexity of ethical reasoning and the need for careful consideration of both descriptive and prescriptive elements in moral discourse. Philosophers continue to grapple with the implications of the is-ought gap for ethical theory and the nature of moral reasoning.